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LOCKHEED MARTIN F-22 RAPTOR SURVIVES CRISIS

The manufacturers of the Raptor and the Pentagon can take a deep breath for now: The US defence budget for the year 2000 has enough funds to guarantee the continuation of the F-22-Program. Thus a further round in the political fight for the future of the United States superfighter has come to an end. The wrangle had begun on 17 July 1999.

Completely out of the blue, the Appropriations Committee of the US House of Representatives had decided to cut the $1.8bn intended to fund the first six series produced F-22 Raptor aircraft from the budget for the year 2000. Congressmen claimed that it made more sense to spend this money on additional F-15E, F-16CJ and C-130J as well as improving pilots' pay. "Deployments in the Persian Gulf and in Kosovo have made clear that we have other shortcomings, which need to be remedied urgently", the Member of Congress Jerry Lewis, who leads the Subcommittee for Defence, pointed out.

The Pentagon could not deny the fact that investments to boost combat-readiness were extremely necessary. However, according to the Defence Department, endangering the top priority program of the Air Force was going too far. One thing is certain: To delay the program again would mean an explosion of costs. First calculations pointed to additional production costs of at least $5.3bn and a delay in introduction to the troops by two years until 2007.

Figures like these could have meant the Raptor's deathblow - a horror vision for the Air Force. Their entire fighter planning would have become shaky. There was only one thing to do then: A huge PR campaign for the F-22 was started. Industry was very supportive. Everyone from the smallest supplier in 46 states to union reps and even the Air Force Association was roped in to convince the politicians in Washington of the necessity for the new fighter. Lockheed Martin, the main contractor, increased its 50 strong lobbying team still further.

Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ten Generals of the Field Commands put their weight behind the Raptor by issuing open letters. "America needs the F-22, to give our Forces air superiority in any conflict. Pilots who will risk their lives in 2015 are counting on today's leaders to make the right decisions for modernisation," was their message. After all the F-15 Eagle "is a product of 1960s technology, and the age of the fleet is approaching 20 years".

The "improved enlightenment of the politicians" was finally effective. After weeks of tough negotiations, the Senate and House of Representatives managed to arrive at a compromise, which cuts the funding for the Raptor Program in 2000 by just $560 million instead of $1.8 billion.

In order to satisfy all quarters, some crafty procedures were necessary. As demanded by the House of Representatives the first six "series production aircraft" were cut and production decisions were delayed to December 2000. They had initially been planned for December 1999. The budget for development and testing was increased by $1bn to $2.2bn. The Pentagon will now be able to have six "test fighters" built with this money. It can also order long-lead parts for the first ten series produced aircraft ($277mio). As a precautionary measure around $300mio were earmarked, as compensation to industry, in case the program was to be terminated after all. These funds may be used by the Raptor rogram later on.

So far, so good. One problem for the Pentagon remains though: the Members of Congress have placed difficult new conditions before a productian approval can be made. The F-22 will have to fly with the Block-3.0-Software and will have to fulfil various other performance parameters. They furthermore expect a report from the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, who is known to be hyper critical. He must certify that tests up to date are adequate enough to assess the performance of the F-22 avionics, the stealth characteristics and the weapons system.

Scepticism towards the $62bn program has increased drastically, and more political attacks on the Raptor are expected. Annual reports of the General Accounting Office are not terribly helpful either. In its report 99-95 it was stated that "during 1998 the time and cost plans as defined in 1997 have not been fulfilled entirely. ... We are in doubt whether it will be possible to complete the development phase (EMD) within the cost limit (of $18.939bn)".

According to the GAO, potential increases in costs are pointing this way. Manufacturing problems of the control surface beams, the tail unit and the wing connecting parts have caused these additional costs. The Air Force and the relevant contractors are currently trying to tackle these problems since they have not been solved yet. It is being considered to postpone some tests to a later date, e g the qualifications of external loads.

The fact that overhead costs of the Lockheed factory in Marietta (Georgia) are being passed on to the F-22 is a further negative factor. The sum in question is bound to rise, because the C-130J Hercules, which is also being manufactured there, does not sell well enough.

As to the schedule, the dates for maiden flights of the next four prototypes are far behind earlier plans. Fatigue and loading trials with both ground test airframes are also lagging behind by six months.

Furthermore the controllers of the General Accounting Office are very sceptical about the complex avionics of the F-22. A new time plan, which was drawn up in August 1998, is said to be unrealistic, which sounds anything but flattering.

GAO seems to find the Air Force's claim that the Raptor will fulfil and even surpass demands on its performance more credible. For reasons of secrecy there are not yet any concrete numbers, but in many cases estimates based on trial flights are several per cent better than the initial guidelines, (the combat radius for example is said to be almost 25 per cent longer).

Pilots of the Combined Test Force in Edwards Air Force Base (California) are full of praise about Raptor's performance. They are especially impressed by the "surplus" thrust of the F119 engines and the fighter's agility.

Overall, the manufacturers and Pentagon are overall very satisfied with the progress of tests. All the test criteria given by the Pentagon in 1999 have already been fulfilled well before time. This resulted in the best bonus figures for Lockheed Martin for years.

However, engineers still have to master the biggest challenge with the complex, integrated avionics system. 30 product teams in 15 firms are working simultaneously on up to three different software versions. Their flawless performance will decide on the future fate of the Raptor. Therefore the situation remains tense.

From page 58 of FLUG REVUE 2/2000